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Abstract This paper uses metropolitan data to test empirically if health insurers possess
monopsony or monopoly-busting power on the buyer-side of the hospital services market.
According to theory, monopsony power is indicated by a fall in output, whereas, monop-
oly-busting power is shown by an increase in output when buyer concentration rises. The
empiricalresultsprovideevidencethatgreaterhealthinsurerbuyerconcentrationisnotasso-
ciated with monopsony power. Instead, some evidence is found to suggest that higher health
insurer concentration translates into increased monopoly-busting power. That is, metropoli-
tan hospitals offer increased services when the buyer-side of the hospitals services market is
more highly concentrated.
Keywords Monopsony · Managed care · Hospital utilization
Introduction
Since the middle of the 1990s, numerous mergers and consolidations have taken place in
the health insurance industry. In fact, the annual number of mergers among managed care
companies averaged 43 during the 1994–2005 period and ranged from a low of 27 in 1995 to
a high of 66 in 1996 (Kaiser Family Foundation). Notable examples include the Aetna and
U.S. Healthcare merger in 1996 and the Anthem and Wellpoint consolidation in 2004. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that mergers among companies may confer net beneﬁts upon society
because of cost efﬁciencies that result from scale and scope economies. However, economic
theory also indicates that horizontal mergers may allow the newly combined company to
enjoy the advantage of increased market power. The increased market power may translate
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into higher prices received for products and/or lower prices paid for inputs. Theory suggests
thattheunbridledexerciseofmarketpowerinoutputorinputmarketscangeneratenetsocial
losses.
In a series of annual reports, the American Medical Association (AMA 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006) has collected and reported information on the concentration of health insurers in var-
ious metropolitan areas of the United States. Based on this data, the AMA ﬁnds a health
insurance industry that is characterized by a few dominant health insurers and believes that
these dominant ﬁrms may engage in monopoly and monopsony behavior. Hence, this orga-
nization warns that health insurers may raise insurance premiums and thereby reduce the
number of insured individuals. In addition, the AMA stresses that health insurers may lower
reimbursement rates paid to health care providers and, as a result, cause contrived shortages
of medical care.
The AMA is not alone in its concerns. Governor Rendall of Pennsylvania claims that
a merger between the state’s two largest health insurers, Highmark Inc. and Independence
Blue Cross, would harm competition (Snowbeck 2006). The Governor notes that employers
in Pennsylvania would be less likely to secure low premiums for health insurance if the
merger is allowed. Moreover, nurses at Landmark Medical Center in Rhode Island recently
protested outside the ofﬁce of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Rhode Island because of the health
insurer’s failure to pay provider rates that sufﬁciently compensates for the quality of medical
care delivered at the health care facility (Malinowsky 2006).
But are these concerns about the market power of health insurers truly justiﬁed on efﬁ-
ciency grounds or do they represent a situation where health care providers are attempting
to protect their monopoly rents? Specifically, it is unclear if lower health care provider reim-
bursement rates by health insurers reﬂect the exercise of monopsony or monopoly-busting
power.Iftheformer,economictheorysuggeststhatthelowerpriceresultsinefﬁciencylosses.
But if the latter, efﬁciency gains occur from lower prices according to theory. Pauly (1998)
and, subsequently, Feldman and Wholey (2001) explain that the only way to determine if
healthinsurersexercisemonopsonyormonopoly-bustingpowerisbyempiricallyexamining
the impact of health insurer buying power on the utilization rate of medical services, an
input in the production of health insurance. If it can be shown empirically that greater buying
power of health insurers is related to lower (increased) utilization of medical services, then
the evidence provides support for monopsony (monopoly-busting) behavior.
Feldman and Wholey (2001) provide the only empirical test, to date, for the monopsony
versus monopoly-busting theories of health insurer buying power. Specifically, they investi-
gate if health maintenance organizations (HMOs) possess monopsony power in the markets
for ambulatory and inpatient hospital services. Using a data set containing all HMOs in the
U.S. over the period from 1985 to 1997 and multiple regression analysis, they investigate
the importance of an individual HMO, as a single buyer, on the price paid and utilization
of inpatient and ambulatory care. Buying power for hospital services is measured by the
percentageofinpatientdaysinthemarketareapurchasedbyeachHMO.Ambulatorybuying
power is measured by the number of ambulatory visits purchased by each HMO per 1,000
active physicians in the market area. Prices are determined by dividing each type of revenue
by the respective quantity measure.
Feldman and Wholey control for a host of supply and demand factors in the regression
equationandﬁndthatHMObuyingpowerlowershospitalpriceandincreaseshospitaloutput.
Thus, their evidence suggests that HMOs use their buying clout to bust the monopoly power
of hospitals. In addition, they determine that HMO buying power has no statistical impact on
the price or output of physician care, perhaps because the physician services market is much
morefragmentedthanthehospitalservices industry.Overall, FeldmanandWholeyconclude
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that HMOs do not exercise monopsony power and that they may have improved efﬁciency
in the hospital services industry through their monopoly-busting power.
While the study by Feldman and Wholey offers valuable insights, it is already dated and
fails to consider the role of preferred provider organizations (PPOs). Feldman and Wholey’s
study covers the years from 1985 to 1997 but many consolidations among health insurers
have taken place since that time. The increased consolidations may have conferred greater
buyingcloutsuchthatasinglehealthinsurercanmoreeasilyexploititsmonopsonyposition.
Also, Feldman and Wholey do not consider if PPOs possess monopsony power.
As a result, this study uses more recent data to explore the monopsony power of HMOs
and PPOs in the hospital services market. The analysis is conducted at the metropolitan level
overtheyearsfrom2001to2004.Sixdifferentmeasuresofhospitaloutputareemployedand
the buying power of the two types of MCOs is measured by the Herﬁndahl/Hirschman Index
(HHI) of market concentration based on the health insurers’ enrollment shares in the various
metropolitan areas. An instrumental variables approach is employed to control for the pos-
sibility that health insurer concentration is endogenous at the industry level. The empirical
results consistently and strongly suggest that HMOs and PPOs do not exercise monopsony
power in the typical hospital services market. Indeed, some evidence is found to support the
monopoly-busting theory of health insurer concentration.
The next section explains the sample and data and sets up the empirical model. Section
threediscussestheempiricalﬁndings.Asummaryandsomeconcludingcommentsareoffered
in the ﬁnal section.
Sample, data, and methodology
The sample used to investigate the impact of MCO buying power on various measures of
output in the hospital services industry has its roots in the series of reports issued by the
AMA. The AMA began collecting and disseminating information on the concentration of
health insurers at the state and metropolitan levels in 2001. Since that time the AMA has
issuedthreeadditionalreports.EachreportcontainsdatafortheHHIseparatelyfortheHMO
and PPO segments of the health insurance industry in various metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) of the U.S.1 The number of MSAs covered in the AMA reports has increased over
time, growing from 40 in 2001 to 294 in 2004.
Several reasons have been offered for treating HMO and PPO plans as distinctly different
health insurance products (US v. Aetna 1999). First, the two plans differ in terms of beneﬁt
design, costs, and other factors. For example, HMO plans are more restrictive with features
such as gatekeepers and tighter provider networks. In addition, HMOs are known to provide
greater preventive care beneﬁts and place limits on treatment options. Second, employers
and employees often perceive PPO and HMO plans as different products that meet different
needs and appeal to different types of enrollees. In fact, enrollees who drop an HMO plan
are disproportionately more likely to choose another HMO plan. Finally, the price elasticity
of demand for HMO plans has been found to be relatively low suggesting that very few
consumers may switch to PPO plans given an increase in price. As a result, HMO and PPO
plans are considered as two different insurance products in the empirical analysis.
The relevant geographical market (RGM) for health insurance is assumed to be the MSA
in the AMA reports because Kopit (2004), and others, have argued that the health insurance
1 The HHI is found by summing the squared market shares of all ﬁrms in the same market. The HHI ranges
between 0 and 10,000 with low values indicating a more competitive market environment. The HHI declines
with a greater number of equally sized ﬁrms.
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marketplace is local in nature since employers and consumers/patients want access to nearby
health care provider networks. For example, an employer in Philadelphia would be unlikely
to switch to a health insurer with an established network of providers in Boston. In their
research on the impact of competitive behavior on the profitability of HMOs, Pauly et al.
(2002) assume that the metropolitan area represents the relevant geographical market for
health insurance.
In the forthcoming empirical analysis, the MSA is also treated as the RGM for hospi-
tal services. While this definition of the RGM is not without its weaknesses (Dravove and
White1994),urbanhospitalmarketsarecommonlydeﬁnedinthismannerforempiricalwork
(Joskow 1980; Manheim et al. 1994; Spang et al. 2001; Douglas and Ryman 2003; Bates et
al. 2006; Santerre and Vernon 2006). But because MSAs like Chicago, Los Angeles, or New
York City may be too large for an individual hospital services market, the empirical test is
also performed using a subset of MSAs that contain fewer than 2 million people to check the
sensitivity of the results.
Bates et al. (2006) argue that treating the metropolitan hospital services industry rather
than the individual hospital as the unit of analysis offers a beneﬁt to the econometrician.
They note that quality of care and patient case-mix both differ considerably across hospi-
tals within a given geographical area as a result of individual hospitals specializing in the
delivery of certain services. For example, Chilingerian and Sherman (2004,p. 485) write;
“Hospital A admits more ‘fevers of unknown origin’ and performs more combined liver
kidney transplants, hip replacements, and coronary by-pass grafts and Hospital B has more
tooth extractions, vaginal deliveries without complications, and circumcisions, it is an unfair
comparison.” By focusing on the MSA as the unit of analysis, these supply-side differences
acrossindividualhospitalswithinagivengeographicalareaareaveragedouttosomedegree,
thereby allowing a cleaner isolation of the relationship between market factors and hospital
services at the MSA level (Keeler and Ying 1996). As the MSA level, the distribution of
treatments and quality of care is likely to be more comparable because of closer similarities
in the underlying types and severities of illnesses across areas.
Because a panel data set helps to control for unobservable heterogeneity, the sample is
deﬁned as those MSAs with at least 2years of health insurer concentration data over the
period from 2001 to 2004. That restriction results in a total maximum sample size of 344
MSA observations over the 4year period with a maximum cross-sectional sample of 86
MSAs. While the total number of observations seems relatively small, the 86 MSAs account
for over 50% of the population in the U.S. Thus, the panel data set potentially conveys a
considerable amount of useful information on the behavior of health insurers and health care
providers.
Health Forum (various years) provides data for six indicators of hospital output. Four
direct measures of hospital services are employed: total admissions, total inpatient days,
total surgeries, and total outpatient visits. Revenue data necessary for determining price are
unavailable so only the impact of health insurer buyer power on output can be empirically
observed. Because the monopsony and monopoly busting theories both predict that insurers’
buying power should reduce providers’ prices, it seems perfectly acceptable to examine the
impact of insurer concentration on quantity without examining its impact on price. To check
the consistency of the ﬁndings, the total number of hospital personnel and labor costs are
speciﬁed as indirect indicators of hospital services. The expectation is that total labor costs
and number of personnel change in the same direction as the direct measures of hospital
output given the derived nature of medical inputs such as labor in production.
To isolate the pair-wise correlation between the various measures of health insurer con-
centrationandeachindicatorofhospitalservices,itisimportanttocontrolforasmanysupply
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and demand factors as possible. However, the lack of consistent time-series/cross-sectional
dataforcedustobeparsimoniousinourselectionofindependentvariables.Controlvariables
inthebasicmodelarepopulation,percapitaincome,andthenumberofhospitalsintheMSA
along with a set of time and metropolitan dummy variables. Data for population and income
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Health Forum (various years) provides the
data for the number of hospitals.
No expectations are made regarding the sign of the estimated coefﬁcients on population
and income per capita because they simply control for a host of factors inﬂuencing hospital
servicesthatrelatetoscaleorphysicalenvironmentandsocioeconomicconditions.However,
the sign of the estimated coefﬁcient on the number of community hospitals is expected to be
positive for two reasons. First, more hospitals imply an increased supply of hospital services.
As long as market demand is not perfectly inelastic, the greater supply will be associated
with an increased quantity of hospital services. Second, a single hospital is likely to hold
less market power when more hospitals exist in the market area so the quantity of services is
expected to be higher.
In an alternative speciﬁcation, but with fewer observations, the following are speciﬁed as
additional control variables: the percentage of the population under 15, the percentage of the
population over 65, the percentage of the population with a bachelors degree, the percentage
ofthepopulationthatiswhite,thepercentageofthepopulationthatispoor,theunemployment
rate, and median value of housing in each MSA during each year. These data are obtained
from the American Community Survey website at the U.S. Census Bureau (various years).
These variables should help control for the impact of age distribution, education, wealth, and
health insurance coverage, among other effects, on the demand for hospital services. Based
upon a review of the literature, Scanlon et al. (2006) conclude that the omission of market
characteristics such as these affect the conclusions drawn from empirical studies concerning
the effects of health insurance competition. As a ﬁnal test, the alternative model is estimated
with a sample of MSAs with fewer than 2million people because the true RGM for hospital
services may be less broadly deﬁned in practice than some of the very large MSAs.
An instrumental variables approach is used to control for the possibility of endogeneity
bias. That is, both the level of hospital services, variously measured, and the degree of health
insurer concentration may be jointly inﬂuenced by some unobservable factors. For example,
the expansion decisions of both hospitals and health insurers may be jointly inﬂuenced by
the health status of people in their market areas. We are unable to control for health status
in the empirical analysis. Therefore the concentration of the HMO and PPO submarkets is
modeled in the ﬁrst stage of the two stage multiple regression analysis.
Becauseemployer-sponsoredhealthinsuranceremainsthedominantformofprivatehealth
insurance in the U.S., the number of ﬁrms in the MSA serves as one instrument to capture
the size of the employer market. Experimentation shows that this variable ﬁts the ﬁrst stage
model best when speciﬁed in quadratic form (in logs). Indicators of ﬁrm size distribution
have previously been used as instrumental variables in the prediction of the number or mar-
ket penetration of health insurers (Dranove et al. 1998; Baker and Brown 1999; Town et al.
2007). The size distribution of ﬁrms in the MSA is captured in the estimation equation by
the average number of employees per ﬁrm. Data for the number of ﬁrms and employees are
obtainedfromtheMSABusinessPatternswebsiteattheU.S.CensusBureau(variousyears).
Finally, the penetration rate of HMOs at the state level in the previous year is speciﬁed
as an additional instrument. These data come from various issues of the Statistical Abstract
of the U.S. The prior year state HMO penetration may indicate the extent to which state
regulations such as guarantee issue, community-rated premiums, and state insurance man-
dates hinder the entry and scale of health insurers. The expectation is that a greater HMO
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penetration at the state level is associated with a lower level of insurer concentration (more
health insurers) at the MSA level.
All of these variables are likely to be correlated with health insurer concentration but
not the level of hospital output—a necessary property for a good instrumental variable. All
variables are expressed in log-form in both the ﬁrst and second stage regression equations.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the various estimation equa-
tions. Notice that the average HHI for the HMO and PPO product markets exceeds the
threshold for a highly concentrated market of 1,800 as set by the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission. Also notice that the HHI varies considerably across MSAs, with
the index ranging from just over 1,000 to well over 9,000. Interestingly, the mean HMO-HHI
increasedfrom3,651in2001to4,323in2003butdeclinedto4,244in2004(datanotshown).
Also,themeanPPO-HHIincreasedfrom4,115in2001to4,599in2001butdeclinedto4,179
in 2004. Given that the AMA increased the number of MSAs in their sample from 1 year
to the next, it is not possible to draw any meaningful implications about the overall trend in
industry concentration from their data.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 also indicate that that a sizeable amount of varia-
tion exists in the degree of seller concentration in the various metropolitan hospital services
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Number
deviation value value of observations
Admissions 187,613 228,664 5,070 1,341,277 344
Inpatient days 1,047,509 1,399,997 39,470 9,884,548 344
Surgeries 139,169 156,678 4,698 981,518 344
Outpatient visits 2,694,464 3,487,177 110,068 23,545,341 344
Personnel 21,582 27,618 855 181,500 344
Labor expenses 2,482,720 3,367,972 57,034 25,139,710 344
Population 1,869,673 2,739,524 108,680 18,754,585 344
Per capita income 30,504 6,103 14,385 49,276 344
Number of community
hospitals
16.5 17.9 1 102 344
HHI for HMOs 4043 2065 1127 10000 262
HHI for PPOs 4322 1579 1370 9363 265
Number of Firms
(Employers)
43,644 62,873 2,797 533,528 338
Employees per Firm 16.10 2.47 10.61 23.04 338
HMO state penetration
rate in previous year
30.01 13.82 6.50 53.50 344
Percent young 0.071 0.012 0.044 0.112 233
Percent old 0.122 0.036 0.072 0.274 233
Percent white 0.732 0.111 0.491 0.936 233
Percent with bachelor
degrees
0.108 0.032 0.0367 0.226 233
Percent unemployment 7.467 1.831 4 14 233
Percent poverty 13.536 5.527 6 44 233
Median value of owner-
occupied housing
178,007 125,975 56,087 689,276 233
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industries. According to the data, about 16 to 17 hospitals operate in the typical MSA in
the sample. However, the number of hospitals varies widely from 1 to 102. Although an
HHI would be preferred to measure seller concentration for the sake of consistency, the data
source provides only the number of community hospitals in each metropolitan area. Fortu-
nately, Wong et al. (2005) show that inferences regarding the broad effect of competition are
not sensitive to whether the number of hospitals or HHI is used to measure the intensity of
seller competition in the hospital services industry.
Empirical results
Table 2 provides the regression results for the ﬁrst stage predicting the HMO and PPO HHIs.
According to the results, HMO concentration declines with metropolitan size, as measured
by population, whereas PPO concentration increases with metropolitan size. Interestingly,
HMO and PPO concentration both ﬁrst decline and then increase at some point with respect
tothenumberofﬁrmsintheMSA.Also,greaterHMOmarketpenetrationatthestatelevelin
the previous year tends to be associated with lower HHI andPPO concentration, as expected.
Finally, the average number of employees per ﬁrm evidently inﬂuences the number and size
distribution of PPOs but not HMOs. Specifically, PPO concentration declines with more
employees per ﬁrm. More importantly, the set of instruments in each ﬁrst stage equation has
a statistically significant impact on the HHI as determined by a Wald test. In addition, the
F-statisticsexceedsthethresholdvalueof10,assetbyStaigerandStock(1997),fordetecting
weak instruments.
Selected ﬁndings for the second stage results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Recall that
monopsony theory predicts a negative coefﬁcient estimate on the HMO-HHI, and PPO-HHI.
Table 2 First stage results for HMO and PPO Concentration
Log of HMO-HHI Log of PPO-HHI
Constant 39.11∗∗(3.93) −2.954 (0.16)
Log of population −0.265∗∗ (2.39) 1.679∗∗ (4.45)
Log of per capita income −0.901 (1.16) 0.988 (0.87)
Log of number of hospitals −0.066 (0.90) −0.047 (0.31)
Log of number of ﬁrms −3.026∗∗ (3.92) −2.320∗ (1.95)
Log of number of ﬁrms squared 0.130∗∗ (3.76) 0.104* (1.94)
Log of employees per ﬁrm 0.151 (0.46) −2.826∗∗ (5.25)
LogofstateHMOpenetrationrate
in previous year
−0.336∗∗ (2.92) −0.546 (1.59)
Number of observations 256 259
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.261
F-test for instrumental variables 10.96 (prob.=0.0000) 17.91 (prob.=0.0000)
Notes: Coefﬁcient estimates with t-statistics reported in parentheses
Cross-section seemingly unrelated standard errors and covariance
All speciﬁcations include MSA and time ﬁxed effects
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
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Table 3 Abbreviated two stage least square results
Measure of Output Estimated coefﬁcient Estimated coefﬁcient Adjusted R2 Number
(t-statistic) on HMO-HHI (t-statistic) on PPO-HHI of observations
Basic Modela
Admissions 0.059(0.82) −0.021(0.41) 0.998 252
Inpatient days 0.150∗∗(2.81) −0.015(0.22) 0.997 252
Surgeries −0.003(0.02) 0.030(0.38) 0.995 252
Outpatient visits 0.091(0.52) 0.238∗∗(2.25) 0.987 252
Hospital personnel 0.110(1.17) −0.093(1.60) 0.990 252
Labor expenses −0.020(0.18) −0.056(0.81) 0.997 252
Alternative Modelb
Admissions 0.081(0.92) −0.010(0.18) 0.997 172
Inpatient days 0.181∗∗(2.71) 0.003(0.04) 0.996 172
Surgeries 0.008(0.08) 0.033(0.67) 0.995 172
Outpatient visits 0.220(0.82) 0.199∗∗(2.20) 0.989 172
Hospital personnel 0.015(0.34) −0.024(0.46) 0.996 172
Labor expenses −0.069(0.65) 0.005(0.07) 0.997 172
a All continuous variables expressed as logs. Control variables include population, per capita income, number
of hospitals, and a set of metropolitan dummy variables
b Same as above plus percent young, percent old, percent white, percent with bachelor degrees, percent unem-
ployed, percent poverty, and median value of owner-occupied housing (in logs)
Cross-section seemingly unrelated standard errors and covariance
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
In contrast, positive coefﬁcient estimates on these concentration variables provide empirical
support for the monopoly-busting theory. Looking ﬁrst at the results for the basic equation
reported at the top of Table 3, we can see that the estimated coefﬁcient on the HMO-HHI
has a negative sign in only two of the six equations. But in those two cases, the coefﬁcient
estimates are not statistically significant. In addition, the HMO-HHI possesses a positive and
statistically significant coefﬁcient estimate in the inpatient days equations. While the coef-
ﬁcient estimates on the PPO-HHI are negative in 4 of the 6 equations, they are not different
from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. In addition, the PPO-HHI has
a positive and statistically significant coefﬁcient estimate in the outpatient visits equation.
Taken alone these regression results indicate that health insurers do not possess monopsony
power on the buyer side of the hospital services market.
Onceadditionalcontrolvariablesareaddedtothebasicmodel,notmuchchangeoccursin
themagnitudeandstatisticalsignificanceoftheestimatedcoefﬁcientsontheHHIs,asshown
inthebottompanelof Table3.Moreover,nostatisticalevidenceisfoundtosupportamonop-
sony view of health insurer concentration. The number of inpatient days is directly related to
greater HMO concentration and a direct relationship exists between PPO concentration and
the number of outpatient visits.
Table 4 shows the multiple regression ﬁndings when the sample is limited to MSAs with
fewer than 2million people. The concern is that the RGM for hospital services market may
be too broadly deﬁned in the larger MSAs. These results closely mirror the results for the
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Table 4 Abbreviated two stage least square results for MSAS with fewer than 2 million people
Measure of output Estimated coefﬁcient Estimated coefﬁcient Adjusted R2 Number
(t-statistic) on HMO-HHI (t-statistic) on PPO-HHI of observations
Alternative Modela
Admissions 0.041(0.59) −0.052(0.67) 0.992 118
Inpatient days 0.186∗∗(2.92) −0.042(0.47) 0.989 118
Surgeries −0.147(1.13) −0.114(0.75) 0.984 118
Outpatient visits −0.097(0.67) −0.015(0.19) 0.985 118
Hospital personnel 0.056(0.59) −0.017(0.16) 0.989 118
Labor expenses −0.006(0.07) 0.002(0.02) 0.992 118
a Control variables include population, per capita income, number of community hospitals, percent young,
percent old, percent white, percent with bachelor degrees, percent unemployed, percent poverty, median value
of owner-occupied housing (all in logs), and MSA and time ﬁxed effects
Cross-section seemingly unrelated standard errors and covariance
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level
larger sample of MSAs. Like before, HMO concentration is directly related to the number
of inpatient days. The only difference is that PPO concentration is no longer associated with
an increased number of outpatient visits.2
Allinall,theempiricalresultsstronglysuggestthathealthinsurersdonotpossessmonop-
sony power. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Greater HMO concentration is shown
to be associated with an increased amount of inpatient services and some evidence indicates
that higher PPO concentration and outpatient visits are directly related. More specifically,
the estimated elasticities suggest that a 10% increase in HMO concentration is associated
with about 1.5–1.9% more inpatient days. Using sample averages, that percentage difference
means 3 more patients per day are treated at the typical hospital on an inpatient basis because
of 10% greater HMO concentration. It also may mean that hospitals are less likely to release
patients “quicker and sicker” when health insurers are more inﬂuential in their market areas.
Theresultsalsoimplya10%increaseinPPOconcentrationmaybeassociatedwith2%more
outpatient visits. That percentage translates into nearly 9 more outpatient visits per day at the
typical hospital. The implication is that hospitals typically reduce some services and thereby
raise price in the absence of health insurer buying power.3
Conclusion
Following the suggestion of Pauly (1998) and lead of Feldman and Wholey (2001), this
paper revisits the question of whether health insurers possess monopsony power. The test is
conductedbyobservingtheimpactofhealthinsurerconcentrationonthequantityofhospital
services.Monopsony(monopoly-busting)theorypredictsaninverse(direct)relationbetween
2 The estimated coefﬁcient on the PPO-HHI remains positive and statistically significant in the 0.25 to 0.26
range until a sample cutoff of 4million people is speciﬁed. The statistically insignificant coefﬁcient estimate
on the PPO-HHI may reﬂect that the remaining MSAs are too narrowly deﬁned with respect to the RGM for
PPO purchased hospital services after that cutoff point.
3 Asexpected,theestimatedcoefﬁcientsareallpositiveandstatisticallysignificantonthenumberofhospitals.
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health insurer concentration and hospital services. This paper extends the literature on this
topic by investigating the impact of HMO and PPO concentration on six different measures
of services offered by metropolitan hospitals during the period 2001–2004.
Taking all of the empirical results together, it appears that health insurers do not engage
in monopsony behavior. The relationships between buyer concentration and the six different
measures of hospital services are either direct or statistically insignificant. Consequently, it
appears that much of the attention being paid to consolidations among health insurers may
largely reﬂect that health care providers are trying to protect their monopoly rents. In fact,
the empirical ﬁndings suggest that health insurers, when they possess more buyer clout, can
negotiate additional inpatient days and outpatient visits without necessarily raising the num-
ber of personnel and labor expenses. This ﬁnding agrees with Bates et al. (2006)w h oﬁ n d
empirically that metropolitan hospitals are more efﬁcient when health insurers dominate the
health insurance industry at the state level.
One intriguing aspect of the results concerns the ﬁnding that hospital services may be
inﬂuenced differently depending on whether greater buyer concentration shows up in the
HMO or PPO segments of the hospital services industry. It appears that increased buyer
concentration from HMOs puts pressure on hospitals to increase inpatient services whereas
PPOs may impact the amount of outpatient services. That discrepancy likely reﬂects that
PPO enrollees use outpatient hospital facilities more often than HMO enrollees because the
latter typically must obtain prior authorization from their gate-keeper primary care givers.
Because price data are unavailable for the test, we cannot be sure if the ineffectiveness of
HMOs and PPOs, with regard to inﬂuencing the provision of some types of hospital services
like admissions or surgeries, holds because these buyers could not secure price discounts or
because they were unable to affect health care provider behavior.4 Or it may be the case that
inpatient days and outpatient visits are more discretionary at the margin than the other types
of services. Future research may want to more thoroughly explore that relationship.
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